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HUMANISM. Philosophical Essays. By F. C. S. Schiller, Fellow and Tutor of Corpus Christi College, Oxford. London: Macmillan & Co., 1903, xxv, 297.

The fifteen more or less disconnected essays which form this book are intended to advocate the latest philosophy, Pragmatism, which Mr. Schiller has renamed Humanism. Most of them are critical; and some of the criticisms—e. g., of Lotze's Monism (Essay IV) and some in the Essay on Preserving Appearances—are sound. But the truth of these is quite independent of the Humanism element, which, judging from the preface, is the most important part of the book. But what that element is and means it is indeed difficult to understand; and Mr. Schiller, by the wantonness and vulgarity of much of his writing, has prevented any sympathetic attempt to do so. Mr. Schiller is no doubt right in protesting against the absolutist philosophies; but he should have adopted a better tone.

But Humanism, the philosophy which he recommends, is something far worse. "There are not really any eternal and non-human truths to prohibit us from adopting the belief we need to live by" (xvii). "With common sense Humanism will ever keep in touch, by dint of refusing to value or validate the products of merely speculative analyses, void of purpose and of use." But Mr. Schiller elsewhere asserts that all cognition is teleological (10). The first essay is an attempt to prove that there is a supremacy of "good" over "true" and "real." Reality is a response to a will to know. All our thought is purposive. "The response to our questions is always affected by their character, and that is in our power." "Reality is not determinate but determinable." "The eternal 'truths' are postulates, and theoretical principles, like practical, get their meaning from their use; they are called true, if they prove useful." The main proposition of Humanism seems to be that "what is useful is true, and what is true is useful." But on p. 147 we read that "there is everywhere in the sciences a tendency to forget that methodological assumptions are not necessarily true because they are useful." Mr. Schiller would have us believe that usefulness is the only criterion of truth. The fifth essay, upon Non-Euclidean geometry and the Kantian *a priori* shows that the validity of Euclidean geometry is empirical. Mr. Schiller says it is true because it is useful when applied. The sixth essay, on the Metaphysics of the Time

Process, criticises the philosophies which deny the reality of time. "The defects of our thought symbols for reality should stimulate us to improve them," not to reject as unreal what they symbolise, because they are self-contradictory. "Scientific 'laws' are methodological devices for practical purposes. Ethics as a science of ends conditions metaphysics." The seventh essay, on Reality and Idealism, asserts the same doctrine. The criteria of reality have only a practical value. But Mr. Schiller elsewhere (p. 10) says that "real" means real for certain purposes. And he gives no means of determining what purposes should be our purposes. The next essay, on Darwinism and Design, contains some obvious cautions against the idea that the theory of Natural Selection has completely destroyed the argument from design. There is one false assertion (on p. 134) that "on the Darwinian assumption only those qualities can be developed which have a value for survival." The twelfth essay, on Activity and Substance, recommends the Aristotelian *ἐνεργεία* as the true substance. *ἑνεργεία ἀκινήσιας* is a scientific conception of heaven and eternity. But Mr. Schiller does not see that interaction is possible only in time (p. 218). And perhaps this is a suitable place for pointing out that Mr. Schiller is not justified in using the word interaction (and many others), unless he admits the truth of the law of causality. For the truth of that law can alone justify any assertion about cause and effect or interaction. If its truth is a postulate, it is a postulate for a certain purpose. Mr. Schiller should explain exactly what purpose.

The essay on the Desire for Immortality suggests causes for the indifference of men to the question of immortality. The fourteenth essay attempts to shew that immortality is an ethical postulate. Mr. Schiller does not see that morality is the adaptation of means to known ends. The last essay contains some general remarks upon the investigation of the questions whether we are immortal.

The main theme of "Humanism" would seem to be the assertion that all truths are postulates, and that we can postulate anything which is necessary to enable us to live. (This seems to be the meaning of "usefulness.") But Mr. Schiller's theory does not explain how it is possible to know what is useful. Evolution, it seems, will tell. But evolution is itself a postulate. And so we are driven round with never an answer as to the end of it all. The law of causality is only true because it is useful to explain

reality; because that explanation is useful. That is, that the usefulness of the explanation is the ground of the "truth" of the law of causality. But Mr. Schiller can only assert that the explanation is useful if he admits the validity of the law of causality. For useful means productive of some good, being the cause of some good effect; and Mr. Schiller can only assert that anything is the cause of anything else if he admits the validity of the law of causality.

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THE CHRIST IDEAL: A STUDY OF THE SPIRITUAL TEACHINGS OF JESUS. By Horatio W. Dresser. New York and London: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1901. Pp. 150.

This little volume seeks to present the ideal for which "the Christ" stands. There are three ways of approaching such a task. One may attempt, by literary and historical criticism of the gospel records, to find out what Jesus actually said and did, in order to gain a knowledge of his aims and ideals, his spirit and his character. If this way is entered and resolutely followed, the conclusion is almost inevitably reached that the term "Messiah" or "Christ," applied, in its historical sense, to Jesus of Nazareth is a misnomer. He never claimed to be the Messiah, never accepted for himself any Messianic title, never allowed his disciples to say that he was the Messiah, never uttered a word that justifies the assumption that he cherished in secret any ambition to become a Messiah. The whole trend of his teaching and life as a prophet ran contrary to the Messianic ideal. His words and deeds suggest ideals of a nobler social order, conceived of as the coming kingdom of heaven on earth, and of a worthier moral and religious attitude in view of that great hope, ideals at once dimmed and perverted when a personal ambition for kingship is falsely ascribed to Jesus. When this is understood, the very love and reverence that Jesus inspires will make it appear like an injustice to him to obscure his own ideal by applying to him titles which he did not covet, but virtually repudiated, and which indicate an entirely different ideal.

Another avenue of approach is to inquire what the term has meant to the Christian Church and what ideal it has suggested. The Christ-conception crystalized in the ecumenic creeds has not exercised a less powerful influence for good and evil in the